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RECENT DECISIONS
who purchased it were acting in good faith and supposed that the
corporation was solvent." 5 In this case, however, all claims of prior
creditors had been satisfied and subsequent creditors (the officers)
had notice of the agreement to buy back the stock. Even though
there was no contract according to the tenets of former decisions of
the court, 6 recovery was permitted. Hence the rule seems to be that
recovery may be had under an agreement to buy back stock as against
creditors who had notice of the agreement. This result departs from
mechanistic legal reasoning-for an agreement heretofore held to be
utterly void is in this instance, for sound reasons, enforced.
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OwNER.-Plaintiff was struck and injured in New York City by defendant's automobile which was being
operated by defendant's son at the time of the accident. The injuries
were the result solely of the negligence of the operator of the car.
Defendant disclaimed liability on the ground that at the time of the
accident his son was not operating the car in his business or with his
permission. He testified that he had given his permission for the
use of the car on Long Island but had expressly forbidden its being
taken into the city. The question with respect to the circumstances
under which the car was taken out on the particular occasion was not
tried before a jury, the parties having stipulated to waive a jury.
The trial Court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding that where
the owner intrusts his car to another to be used in the business or
pleasure of the driver, a violation of restrictions upon the route to be
taken should not relieve the owner from liability under the statute.
On appeal, held, error. The Highway Law ' imposes no liability on
the owner for the negligence of one who uses the automobile unlawfully or without permission of the owner. Chaika v. Vandenberg,
252 N. Y. 101, 169 N. E. 103 (1929).
Evidence as to the owner's instructions to a person driving his
car is admissible to show the extent of his authority. The intent
of the legislature was not to make an arbitrary rule of liability on the
part of an owner for all accidents caused by the negligent operation
of his car but only in cases where an agency can be spelled out and
where the person is "legally using the same with permission of the
owner," which is interpreted by the instant case and a number of
OwNER ATTRIBUTABLE
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Re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357, 363 (C. C. A., 2nd, 1914).

Supra Note 4.
282-e (Cons. L., Ch. 25), now Vehicle and Traffic Law. Sec. 59
(Cons. L., Ch. 71) : "Every owner of a motor vehicle * * * operated upon a
public highway shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle * * *
in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner."

' Sec.
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previous cases to mean within the limits of the principal's business

and within the extent of the owner's permission.2 Some time back
the courts inclined toward the view that the owner of a motor vehicle
was responsible for the manner in which it was driven,3 tending to
favor plaintiffs in negligence actions against owners. Even in those
cases, however, it was held to be no more than a presumption that
the owner was responsible for the operation of the auto and the presumption disappears where there is substantial evidence to the contrary. 4 Whether the evidence in this case was substantial remained
to be determined. A defendant should have an opportunity to introduce evidence tending to refute the presumption of his control.
Operation contrary to instructions vitiates the owner's control as
completely as though the car were operated by one who had converted
it to his own use. In Rolfe v. Hewett, 5 an owner was sued for
injuries resulting in death caused by the negligence of his chauffeur
who had been forbidden by the owner to take riders. It was held
that the act of the chauffeur in taking the deceased as a rider contrary
to his express instructions relieved the owner from liability. The
holding in this case, it was thought,6 would be overruled by the force
of Section 282-e enacted in 1924, but judicial construction has limited
the application of the legislative enactment to those cases where the
operator is acting within the limitations of the permission granted by
the owner of the car.

J.C.

MOTOR VEHICLES-SERVICE OF PRocEss ON NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT*-JURISDICTION OF CITY CoURT.-Action in City Court of
New York for personal injuries and property damage sustained in"
the alleged negligent operation by defendant of one of its buses in
the city of New York.. The defendant is a foreign corporation,
operating a fleet of buses through New York City. It has its place
of business in the state of New Jersey and has no office for the transaction of business in this state. The summons and complaint were
served on the Secretary of State at Albany pursuant to Section 52 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law. The defendant contends that it was.
not served within the city of New York. the territorial jurisdiction
of the City Court and moves to dismiss the summons and complaint.
'O'Brien v. Stern Bros., 223 N. Y. 290, 119 N. E. 550 (1918); Coyne v.
Kennedy, 229 N. Y. 550, 129 N. E:911 (1920); Fioco v. Carver, 234 N. Y. 219,
137 N. E. 309 (1922); Fleugel v. Coudert, 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 683
(1927) ; Psota v. Long Island R. R. Co., 246 N. Y. 388, 159 N. E. 180 (1927).
'Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406 (1915).
' Potts v. Pardee, 220 N. Y. 431, 116 N. E. 78 (1917).
5227 N. Y. 486, 125 N. E. 804 (1920).
' See Plaumbo v. Ryan, 213 App. Div. 517, 210 N. Y. S. 225 (2nd
Dept. 1925).
* See Current Legislation Section, infra p. 333.

